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ADVENTITIOUS PRESENCE OF PATENTED GENETICALLY
MODIFIED ORGANISMS: IS INTENT NECESSARY FOR
ACTIONS IN INFRINGEMENT?
Ikechi Mgbeoji1

I. INTRODUCTION
Patent law has in the past two centuries exhibited an incredible
capacity for survival in the face of daunting odds (Drahos/1996).
From its earliest beginnings in medieval Florence and Venice, to
its contemporary omnipresence, the patent system remains a
study in resilience and adaptability (Mgbeoji/2006). Examples of
its historical trials and triumphs include the British public
outrage against monopolies with the resultant emergence of the
Statute of Monopolies; the excessively predatory practices of
patent monopolies of 18th century and the resultant introduction
of compulsory licensing; and lately, the emergence of
biotechnological industries and the consequent relaxation of the
doctrines on patentability (Dutfield/2003).
In its growth and development, the patent system has been
influenced by the flow of capital to new industries such as in the
emergence of the chemical industry in Western Europe; the
birth of biotechnology in the past century; and the ubiquity of
information technologies in contemporary times (Abbott/2002).
Put simply, there is a persuasive school of thought that argues
that doctrines and principles of patent law often reflect the
prevailing self-interests of influential and powerful industrial
interests. (Anderfelt/1971). As a recent commentator observed,
the history of technological industries “recounts how these
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corporations have affected and been affected by the development
of intellectual property law not just recently but going over back
over a century, and have helped to shape the intellectual
property (IP) regimes in many countries and internationally in
very fundamental ways that today’s policy makers ought to be
aware of” (Dutfield/2003).
Of course, the processes in which powerful corporations and
their parent states influence patent doctrine are not without
controversy (Reddick/2004). It is plausible that with the
exception of the anti-patent movement that swept across
Western Europe and the United States in the late nineteenth
century, no other threat to the existence of the patent system
has been as dire as various technological challenges that often
stretch the principles and doctrines of patent law to incredulous
lengths (Acharya/1999). In this context, a contemporary issue
and one in which the influence of powerful corporate entities is
implicated is whether intent is part of the law on patent
infringement. In particular, is a person who by no individual
fault comes into possession of adventitious patented genetic
material (e.g., through the accidental, or adventitious appearance
of a genetically modified organism) be liable to the patentee in
infringement?
This question arises because of the unique ability of certain
biotechnological inventions to escape the control of their lawful
owners (Bent., et al/1987). Biotechnological products,
particularly, transgenic products, are unique at least in one
respect: they can, and do replicate themselves in a manner
outside the control of either the patent holder or the alleged
infringer (Bud/1993). The status or lack thereof of intent in the
law on infringement of patents with particular respect to
adventitious genetic material is one that has recently aroused
the interest of some scholars. (Cullet/2005). This in turn
compels a re-consideration of the traditional law on
infringement of patents.
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Patent law grants a patentee, the exclusive authority to make,
sell, use, construct or otherwise exercise proprietary control
over the subject-matter of the patent (Roughton/ 2006). In effect,
any person who without the consent and permission of the
patentee, makes, sells, uses, constructs or otherwise exercises
proprietary control over the subject-matter of a valid patent has
infringed the patent and is potentially liable to the patentee.
Infringement does not cover a product as such; it covers acts
relating to a product such as making it, dealing with it, keeping
it or by such other acts that interferes with the rights of the
patent holder. Without overstating the importance of the issue,
the “core of any system of patents is infringement” (Roughton,
et al/ 2005).
Although the element of intent in infringement of patents has
largely been dealt with by the courts for decades largely in
relation to the assessment of damages, traditional patent law
doctrine has long been of the view that in most cases, intent is
irrelevant when considering the issue of infringement. However,
none of the old cases have dealt with the issue in relation to the
specific question of whether the old doctrine is sensible with
respect to adventitious genetic material. Two recent cases from
Canada--Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser; Hoffman v.
Monsanto Canada Inc. (currently under appeal)- somewhat
broached the issue. In Monsanto v. Schmeiser, Monsanto
successfully argued that ownership of a patent for a molecularly
engineered plant patent gene and transgenic plant seed entitled
it to full control over stray plants and progeny containing the
gene. The flip side of the argument, that is, whether the
patentee is equally responsible for any damage caused by
patented stray genetic material was raised in Hoffman v.
Monsanto. Although the merits of this argument has not yet
been tested in the courts,(Glenn/2003) it would suffice to note
that a patentee is hardly responsible for any wrongful use of or
damage caused by an invention to third-parties (c/f deBeer/2007)
.
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The narrow issue which this paper seeks to explore is whether
traditional patent law’s stance on intent in relation to
infringement is sensible when applied to adventitious patented
GMO’s. In other words, to be liable in infringement, would a
plaintiff have to show that the authorised making, selling, or
using of the patented GMO by the defendant was intentional?
Conversely, would a defendant escape liability in infringement
by showing that the subject-matter of the patent came into
his/her possession without his/her knowledge? Towards a
careful examination of this issue, this short paper is divided into
4 parts including the introduction. Part 2 examines the doctrines
and legal principles governing the construction of claims in
patent law. In the determination of whether an act of
infringement has occurred with respect to a valid patent, the
first task is to identify and delimit the scope of property rights
to which the patent holder is entitled. Thereafter, the fact finder
proceeds to determine the subordinate issue of whether the acts
complained of has interfered with the rights of the patent
holder. With patented genetic products capable of escaping from
the control of a patent holder or a lawful licensee, the second
aspect of infringement raises peculiar problems, especially, the
element of intent. Part 2 thus seeks to settle the question of
whether infringement is absolutely a strict liability tort (strict
liability involves liability even where there is no fault or
carelessness) or whether there are circumstances in which intent
to infringe is a necessary element in a case of infringement.
Part 3 takes the analysis further by exploring the peculiarities of
self-dispersible and adventitious patented GMOs. In addition,
part 3 contends that if the patented GMO is an adventitious
type, it stands to reason that intent to infringe is a relevant issue
and as such, no reasonable tribunal may make a finding of
liability without resolving the issue of intent. Part 4 concludes
the analysis with an observation that modern patent law would
need to be revised to accommodate the justice of ensuring that
innocent defendants who for no fault of theirs find patented
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genetic materials in their possession are not penalized in
damages (Siebrasse/2004).

II. INFRINGEMENT OF PATENT RIGHTS IN
CONTEMPORARY PATENT LAW
Although the scope and incidents of the rights granted to a
patent holder are statutorily prescribed, the nature and character
of such statutory provisions have necessarily been fleshed out by
various judicial pronouncements. From the statutory
perspective, s. 42 of the Canadian Patent Act provides for the
scope and incidents of patent ownership. The section provides
thus:
s. 42. Every patent granted under this Act…shall
subject to this Act, grant to the patentee and the
patentee’s legal representatives for the term of the
patent, from the granting of the patent, the exclusive
right, privilege and liberty of making, constructing and
using the invention and selling it to others to be used,
subject to adjudication in respect thereof before any
court of competent jurisdiction. [emphasis mine]
(Patent Act)
By the foregoing, it seems clear that a patent seeks to protect the
subject-matter of the invention from unauthorised acts that
interfere with the rights of the patent holder (Whirlpool/1999).
In short, a patent is infringed when a person, without the lawful
consent, permission or authorization of the patentee makes,
constructs, uses or sells the subject-matter of the patent
(Apotex/2002). It must be understood here that the property
rights forming the subject-matter of the patent are as delimited
in that portion of the patent document generally known as the
“claim/s”. The claim/s delimit(s) the scope and nature of the
exclusive property rights granted to the patent holder
(Freeworld/2004).
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Consequently, when a question of alleged infringement of a
patent is in issue, the courts refer to the claims in the patent for
a proper understanding of the scope of the patentee’s rights.
Absent a determination of the scope of a patentee’s property
rights, it is not possible to make a determination as to whether
or not an act of infringement has occurred. This distinction is of
radical importance because two or more inventions may cover a
similar subject-matter and yet not infringe each other if the
claims are worded differently or the words used capture the
essence of different inventions. For example, if a person invents
a pistol and another person invented a telescopic rifle, both
products, though covering a similar subject-matter—guns—may
differ in the property rights of each respective patentee. The
latter would not infringe the former if the claim deals with the
application of a telescope to a gun. Thus, the words used in the
claims and the approach adopted by court in the construction or
interpretation of the words are crucial in determining whether
or not an infringement has occurred.
In the biochemical or pharmaceutical fields, differences in the
words used in the claims can be very significant, indeed, radical.
For example, Prof. Daly and the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) own US patent# 5,565,573 on synthesis of epibatidine and
analogs thereof; US patent #5,545,741 for the process of
preparing of epibatidine; US patent #5,510,490 for the process of
the preparation of epibatidine, and US patent # 5,314, 899 for
epibatidine and derivatives plus compositions and methods of
treating pain. On the other hand, Abbott Laboratories owns US
Patent #6,133,253 on the use of epibatidine derivatives for
treatment of pain while UCB SA of Belgium owns patent #
6,177,451 & 6,077,846 claiming use of epibatidine for treating
nicotine addiction, Tourette’s syndrome, Parkinson’s disease,
and Alzheimer’s disease. All the patents relate one way or
another to epibatidine but differ significantly on the many
potential uses of and methods of making epipatidine. Invariably,
it is the claim(s) in the patent that define the scope of property
rights granted to a patent-holder. Claims that have been drafted
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widely are more likely to be infringed than those with narrow
claims. (Mgbeoji: 2003)
Given the central role of claims in the determination of
infringement cases, the important question that falls for
determination is: how do the courts interpret claims? As earlier
noted, finding infringement is both an issue of law and of fact.
While the interpretation of the scope of claims is a question of
law, the determination of whether the defendant’s conduct falls
within or outside of the lawfully delimited scope of the patent
rights of the patentee is in itself a question of fact
(Freeworld/2004).
With respect to the former, various courts in diverse
jurisdictions have in the past century, grappled with the
appropriate approach to the construction of claims and thus, the
determination of infringement. In the United States, for
example, the “pith and marrow” approach held sway for decades
(Graver Tank/1950). The pith and marrow approach posits that
an infringement occurs when a defendant unlawfully takes,
makes, and uses the pith and marrow of an invention. By this
approach, courts in the United States purport to distinguish
between the pith of an invention from the bells and whistles.
This approach is also known as the doctrine of equivalents
(Warner-Jenkinson v Hilton Davis/1997). In applying the
doctrine of equivalents, the court asks and determines, “what
constitutes the essential components of the invention?” If the
invention is a mechanical device, for example, the test is one of
mechanical equivalence. In making a factual determination on
infringement, the test would have to determine whether the
alleged infringer’s device interfered with the monopoly enjoyed
by the original patented mechanical device. Similarly, if the
invention is a chemical compound, the issue would be whether
the patented substance differs from similar compounds of the
same class (Warner-Jenkinson/1997).
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In practice, however, the US doctrine of equivalents boils down
to what is generally referred to as the triple identity test, that is,
whether the alleged infringing article performs the same
function, in the same way, and produces the same result as the
patented subject matter (Graver Tank/1950). The triple identity
test offers little protection when the alleged infringement
pertains to inventions of great sophistication and subtlety where
the slightest difference or nuance could make radical differences
between the allegedly infringing product and patented product.
Moreover, when the inventions at issue pertain to
biotechnological products capable of drifting and regenerating on
their own without human intervention, the limitations of the
triple identity test become obvious.
Although decisions in the court of one country are not binding
on the courts of other countries, it is often the case that courts
with similar legislative provisions often engage in some form of
“dialogue” with one another (Hogg/2004). It is therefore not
surprising that the triple identify found its way into Canadian
patent law in the 1960s and 1980s (McPhar/1960) but seems to
have been eclipsed by what is referred to in Canada as the
“purposive approach” (the purposive approach seeks to
understand what the purspose of the original invention is,
having regard to the claims in the patent) (Whirlpool/2000).
Since the decision of the Supreme Court in Free World v. Electro
Sante, it is settled law that courts in Canada construe the claims
in a purposive manner to determine whether the defendant’s
conduct infringed on the rights of the patent holder. In England,
the current approach seems to be the natural construction route
(that is, a process whereby the words used in the patent claims
are given their natural and ordinary meaning as understood by
persons skilled in the relevant art) advocated by Lord Hoffman
in Kirim-Amgen [Kirim-Amgen/2004].
Regardless of which interpretive approach a court chooses to
apply, once the court comes to a conclusion as to the scope of
property rights conferred on the patentee, the alleged infringing
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acts of the defendant would then be examined to see if those
acts in fact amount to infringement. None of the interpretive
approaches to claims construction throws any direct light on
whether intent is required to prove infringement in cases
involving adventitious GMOs. One may also wonder whether it
is really necessary in cases of infringement of genetic patents
that a court should consider the element of intent. This doubt
arises because a general survey of court decisions in either the
US or Canada on infringement yields the impression that
infringement is unquestionably a strict liability tort. Indeed,
ignorance of the law is an ambiguous point of law in
infringement cases.
To resolve the ambiguity, a distinction must be drawn between
ignorance of the legal consequences of the act in question on the
one hand and the absence of intent on the part of the alleged
infringer on the other hand. Like in most cases, ignorance of the
law, and thus of the legal consequences of an act is no excuse.
Thus a person who consciously conducts certain activities
incompatible with the rights of a patentee, although s/he was
oblivious of the legal consequences of such an act cannot escape
liability on infringement by pleading his ignorance of the legal
consequences of acts of infringement. It is therefore natural that
in the reasoning of both Canadian and American courts in cases
of infringement of patents, little or scant regard has been paid to
the ignorance of the infringer of the legal consequences of the
infringing acts.
Generally speaking, for liability to exist in patent infringement,
intent is not relevant (Blair & Cotter/2002). For this apparent
reason, patent infringement is often characterized as a strict
liability tort. However, this characterization is only partially
correct. To the extent that a defendant may be held liable
without having any notice, prior to the filing of an infringement
action, that his/her conduct was infringing, the tort of
infringement may be described as one of strict liability. On the
face of it thus, unintentional or inadvertent infringement is not
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a defense to a patent infringement. Thus, generally speaking, a
court may enjoin a defendant even if the only notice the
defendant had about the patent in issue was the actual writ
commencing the infringement action.
In some cases, however, there are both statutory and judicial
bases in some jurisdictions such as the US and England for the
view that infringement is an objective as opposed to an
unforgiving regime of strict liability. First, in the US, while
assessing damages for infringement, courts take into account the
element of intent. Indeed, in such cases, courts subscribe to the
test of “whether the infringer, acting in good faith and upon due
inquiry, has sound reason to believe that it had the right to act
in the manner found to be infringing” (SRI Int. v. Advanced
Technology Lab/1997).
Second, and with specific regard to the finding of liability in
infringement, courts in England have held that in cases
pertaining to the use of a process, intent is required to show that
the putative infringer knows or it is obvious to a reasonable
person in the circumstances that the use of the process is
infringing (Roughton/2006). Third, in cases pertaining to
supplying means of putting a patented invention into practice,
intent is equally required to prove that the putative infringer
knows or it is obvious to a reasonable person in the
circumstances that the supply of the means in question is
suitable for putting the invention into use and thus infringing
(Adams/2006). Thus, with respect to acts of infringement
consisting of the unauthorized importation, use, sale, or offer to
sell of unpatented products of a patented process, a defendant in
jurisdictions such as the UK may be liable for damages if s/he
has actual knowledge or constructive notice prior to the
infringement. Fourth, in English patent law, intent is a crucial
element in infringement cases where the patent at bar claims a
product of which is to be used in a particular way (MerrilDow/1995). Generally known to UK patent lawyers as “Swiss-
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type claims”, such claims are of the form of “compound XYZ for
use as ABC” (Roughton/2006)
Therefore, from the foregoing, a careful survey of some pertinent
cases from both US and England on infringement shows that
patent infringement is not always a determination that is made
without regard to the nature or characteristics of the invention
in issue. It would seem that a dogmatic or indiscriminate
invocation of the strict liability approach is not always the case
when the courts are called upon to determine infringement
cases. The nature and characteristics of the invention matters a
great deal. Thus, it stands to reason that in cases where the
character of the invention is not susceptible to arguments on
whether or not the alleged infringer intended to infringe, the
courts would naturally consider the issue moot.
However, where the nature and characteristics of the invention
are such as to raise grave questions on the intent of the alleged
infringer, it is submitted that a court should adopt and apply the
totality of circumstances test. This approach, already applied
with respect to the issue of assessment of damages in “wilful
infringement” cases is already well developed in United States
patent law. As Pall has amply demonstrated from a careful
scrutiny of case law in the United States, courts there apply
certain criteria such as (a) copying of the patented product, (b)
duration of the misconduct, (c) remedial action taken by the
infringer, and (d) the defendant’s motivation for harm, et cetera
in determining whether the alleged infringement was wilful or
not.
Put simply, in appropriate cases, patent infringement turns on
whether there has been deliberate disregard for the property
rights of the patentee. In such cases, the test would be whether
the infringer exercised due care to avoid infringement. It may
therefore be stated with confidence that although infringement
is often dealt with as a strict liability offence, most of the
decisions which yield this impression invariably relate to
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inventions that lack the capacity for auto-dispersion and selfregeneration, thus rendering redundant any need for judicial
examination of whether intent is crucial or material to the issue
of infringement. It is submitted that given that there are already
well-established principles of law and instances where, as a
result of the nature of inventions in issue, the courts require
intent as a criterion in determining infringement, it is incorrect
to assert that intent is completely irrelevant in the
determination of infringement (Wright/2001).
However, one should be careful not to overstate the element of
intent in infringement cases (Blair & Cotter/2002). It remains
good law that a patentee who does not market any products
embodying the patent would recover damages for acts of
infringement that occurred prior to the defendant’s receipt of the
writ of summons. Naturally, the damages would be in the form
of royalties, not lost profits (Blair & Cotter/2001). Be that as it
may, it is an overstatement of the legal position to assert that
intent is completely absent in determining infringement. The
better view, in my opinion, is that there are instances, often
dependent on the nature and characteristics of the alleged
infringed invitation, where the state of mind of the alleged
infringer is material (Beidler/1935). The question that falls now
for determination is whether the mental element in required in
infringement cases involving adventitious GMOs. On this issue,
I turn to the decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in
Monsanto v. Schmeiser.

III. ADVENTITIOUS GMOS AND THE ELEMENT OF
INTENT IN PATENT INFRIGEMENT
Regardless of where one stands on the debates on the manifold
impacts of genetically engineered crops, a contemporary
problem with such crops is genetic drift (Khoury &
Smyth/2005). Genetic drift pertains to the inadvertent spreading
of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) from locations that
have chosen such technology to other locations that would not
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want GMOs (Repp/2000). Beyond serious environmental issues,
an unfolding difficulty is the liability of innocent persons for
adventitious patented GMOs that have drifted and germinated
without the intervention of the alleged infringer. Of course, the
flip side of the question is the responsibility of GMO patentees
for damages arising from the genetic drift. Two cases originating
from Saskatchewan, Canada, capture the complexities of these
emergent legal questions (Phillipson/2006). This paper focuses
on the former question.
In Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, the defendant farmed a
large plot of land with non-genetically modified canola. Many of
the neighbouring farms utilized genetically modified canola
engineered to be resistant to glyphosate, an herbicide
manufactured by Monsanto. From all accounts, the controversy
began when quantities of the genetically modified canola was
detected on Mr. Schmeiser’s property. Evidence accepted by all
courts involved in the litigation concluded that Mr. Schmeiser
deliberately re-planted the patented GMO without obtaining the
appropriate license. The majority of the Supreme Court found
that possession of a plant containing a patented gene constitutes
“use” and therefore infringement.
By virtue of the Technology Use Agreement between Monsanto
and contracted farmers, the court reasoned on the question of
infringement that any person who knowingly “uses” a plant
containing the patented gene without appropriate license
infringes the terms of Monsanto’s patent. On the evidence, the
court held that Mr. Schmeiser knew or should have known that
the canola on his farm were glyphosate resistant. Although the
essence of the invention lay in the plant’s resistance to
glyphosate, the majority held that Schmeiser’s failure to spray
his crop with herbicide was immaterial because of the patent’s
“stand-by utility.” Thus, as the majority of the court reasoned,
when Schmeiser harvested and replanted the patented GMO, he
had knowingly appropriated or “used” a patented subject-matter
without legitimate authorization or license.
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Some commentators have argued that by the court’s reasoning,
the test applied was one of actual or constructive knowledge as
opposed to an intent-to-acquire (Preston/2003). With all due
respect, this interpretation does not sit well with the evidence
as accepted by the court. The concurrent finding of the courts is
to the effect that irrespective of how he came about the patented
GMO, Mr. Schmeiser deliberately harvested and re-planted the
GMO. In effect, Mr. Schmeiser did not only have a constructive
knowledge that patented subject-matter was on his property, by
harvesting and re-planting the patented GMO, there was an
intent-to-acquire the patented GMO.
Nevertheless, the reasoning of the plurality of the court is
problematic in one major respect. The problem stems from the
fact that the “invention” in issue was the engineered plant’s
resistance to glyphosate. Absent the plant’s artificially induced
resistance to glyphosate, there is no invention to protect with a
patent. Thus, “use” of the patented genetic material can only be
effected by spraying the crop with the herbicide. Absent this, the
crop is materially similar to the non-GM variety. To this extent,
the reasoning of the courts in Monsanto v. Schmeiser overstates
the case of infringement against Mr. Schmeiser (Cullet/2004).
It is significant, however, that the judge accepts the proposition
that where landowners ignore adventitious presence of patented
seed, “it would be unfair” to hold such landowners liable in
infringement. The court declined to issue a decision on this
point because it assumed that Mr. Schmeiser knew or should
have known that the seeds he saved were glyphosate resistant
seeds. It is tempting to conclude from the judgment of the court
that in determining the issue of infringement, the element of
intent is otiose and indeed, irrelevant. It is submitted that a
careful reading of both the trial and appellate judgments strongly
suggests that intent is indeed an important element in
infringement, particularly, having regard to the characteristics of
the invention alleged to have been infringed.
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It seems obvious, at least to the present writer, that the main
reason why courts have generally not focused on the element of
intent in infringement cases is that they have until the
emergence of self-propagating genetic matter dealt with cases
involving non-living and non self-propagating matter. The
character or type of the invention implicated in an infringement
is crucial to how or whether the court pays attention to the
issue of intent. Where disputes involve inventions without a
capacity for self-propagation, it would seem that the issue of
intent would be too remote to warrant judicial commentary or
analysis.

IV. CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussions highlight the shortcomings in the
present law and raise the issue of how best to re-articulate the
position regarding intent in infringement cases involving
patented GMOs with capacity for drift. It is eminently sensible
that given the nature of patented GMOs that can drift onto
someone’s property and repeatedly propagate themselves
without human intervention, the element of intent in
infringement cases is indispensable (Farnese/2004). It is for the
foregoing reasons, and especially, the novelty of the issue itself,
that in determining the issue of infringement in the Schmeiser
case, the appellate court explicitly acknowledged that “the
patented Monsanto gene falls into a novel category” because “it
is found within a living plant that may, without human
intervention, produce progeny containing the same invention”
(Schmeiser/2002).
It is telling that the court stated that it left open the question of
whether Monsanto could enforce a claim against a farmer who
inadvertently comes into possession of a GMO plant but does
nothing “to cause or promote the propagation of the plant or its
progeny (by saving and planting the seeds, for example.” Of
course, courts do not determine issues that have not been placed
before them. However, it is respectfully submitted that in a
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hypothetical case where the patented GMO drifted to the
property of an innocent party who takes no positive steps to
replant, sell or in any manner purport to exercise ownership
over the GMO, no action in infringement against such a person
would succeed.
Possession of a patented product, without more cannot be a
sufficient basis for a claim of direct patent infringement. Indeed,
in the American case of L.A. Gear v. E.S. Originals Inc, the
court reasoned that “as a matter of law, mere possession of a
product or machine covered by a patent does not constitute
infringement, absent a threatened or contemplated use or sale. It
seems implicit in cases on infringement that to be liable, the
alleged infringer must possess the patented product in the
expectation or hope of deriving a profit from it. Absent this
qualification, patent law would be left with the ludicrous result
that a defendant who unwittingly comes into possession of a
patented item will be automatically held liable for infringement.
Such a state of affairs is neither consistent with common sense
nor in accord with ordinary notions of justice.
Scholars are increasingly thinking their way through the
complex questions raised by adventitious GMOs and the
injustice of a strict liability regime for infringement of GMOs
(Lichtman/1997). In a thought provoking paper, Stephen Maurer
and Suzanne Scotchmer have argued for the recognition of an
independent discovery defense in patent law. Under this regime,
the standard of liability would be intentional copying (Maurer &
Scotchmer/1998). However, the global minimum standards on
patentability as articulated under the Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Agreements (TRIPs) considers it illegal for
states to institute the independent defence as part of domestic
patent law. Similarly, arguments on the benefits of a negligence
standard for infringement run into problems of high
administrative costs and variations in the standard of care (Blair
& Cotter/2002). States would balk at the idea of setting up
bureaucracies to determine issues of negligence with respect to
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adventitious GMOs. Standards of negligence itself would vary
from one type of GMO to the others. At the end of the day, no
proposed reform is perfect. Nevertheless, Blair and Cotter have
made some interesting suggestions for reform that policymakers would do well to seriously consider. First, they propose
adopting an “actual knowledge standard in a few discrete
situations in which the policies that otherwise may favour an
actual or constructive notice standard do not apply” (Blair &
Cotter/2002). This approach would be eminently sensible in
cases where the infringer knew or had reason to know of the
existence of the patent in issue (Lee & Burrell/2002). There is no
compelling reason why biotechnological inventions with
inherent capacities of auto-regeneration and dispersion should
not fall into this category.
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